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THE SUPREME COURT AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION
Benjamin L. Hooks*
The august Supreme Court of the United States is a political
institution and has been virtually from the beginning. That today's
Court finds itself at the center of intense ideological and political
debate should surprise few serious students of American political
and constitutional history.
The first president, George Washington, had his nominee for
Chief Justice of the United States, John Rutledge, rejected in 1795
not necessarily because Senators objected to the would-be jurist's
views of law, but to his views on the Jay Treaty with Great Britain.
In the early 1800's, the House of Representatives lodged im-
peachment articles against Justice Samuel Chase because of com-
ments that he had made in the charge to the jury at a trial under
the infamous (and highly partisan) Alien and Sedition Acts. The
Senate failed to convict Chase, thus frustrating Jeffersonian efforts
to purge the Court of Federalists. Had the ploy succeeded, almost
certainly impeachment of Chief Justice John Marshall would have
followed.
During the Jackson Administration, Senators rejected the Presi-
dent's first nomination of Roger B. Taney as Chief Justice because
of the nominee's prior service as Secretary of the Treasury and
concerns about his views on the Bank of the United States. Taney,
eventually confirmed, went on to serve for many years. Had the
Senate never confirmed him, much might have been different, for
it was he who wrote the decision in the Dred Scott case,' harbinger
of the Civil War.
* Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People; J.D., 1948, DePaul University College of Law, Chicago. For-
mer Commissioner Federal Communication Commission. Former Judge for the Criminal
Court of Shelby County, Tennessee. First African-American Judge of a Court of Record in a
former Confederate state since Reconstruction. Former Director on the Board of Directors
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and Chairperson of the Leadership Con-
ference on Civil Rights.
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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When the unpopular accidental President, Andrew Johnson, had
the opportunity to fill Supreme Court vacancies, Congress exer-
cised its power to reduce the Court's membership (from nine to
seven) to prevent Johnson from making appointments. The seats
were restored with the election of President Ulysses Grant, partly
to ensure that the decision of Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase in the
Legal Tender Cases2 would be overturned.
Appointments to the High Court are political acts. President
Theodore Roosevelt clearly stated the political nature of the ap-
pointment process as he considered the nomination of Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr. in 1902. In a letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
of Massachusetts, the President wrote:
In the ordinary and low sense which we attach to the words "par-
tisan" and "politician," a judge (sic) of the Supreme Court should
be neither. But in the higher sense, in the proper sense, he is not in
my judgment fitted for the position unless he is a party man, a con-
structive statesman, constantly keeping in mind his adherence to
the principles and policies under which this nation has been built up
... Now I should like to know that Judge Holmes was in entire
sympathy with our views, that is with your views and mine .... 3
President Roosevelt went on to say that he should account him-
self guilty of an "irreparable wrong" were he to nominate someone
"who was not absolutely sane and sound on the great national poli-
cies for which we stand in public life."'4
Interestingly, Theodore Roosevelt's presidential successor, Wil-
liam Howard Taft, finished his earthly course with service as Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Taft is said to have
recounted an incident from his early days on the Court. The Chief
reportedly boasted that he had been put on the bench to change a
few votes. "I looked right at old man Holmes when I said it," Taft
reportedly said.'
It is a legend of American political history how Theodore
Roosevelt's cousin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, brought the
Supreme Court into line on New Deal policies. His court-packing
2. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
3. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge (July 10, 1902), in 3 THE LET-
TERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 289 (Elting E. Morison ed., 1951).
4. Id.
5. ALPHEUS T. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 50 (1958).
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plan - to add an additional Justice for every Justice over the age
of seventy years who did not retire - failed in Congress and in the
court of public opinion. It did, however, seemingly induce the
Court to deal more charitably with New Deal recovery measures.
Said one wag, "A switch in time saves nine."
President Dwight Eisenhower may have thought he was getting a
conservative Chief Justice in the politician Earl Warren, the popu-
lar Governor of California. Instead, he got the man who toppled
school segregation and expanded the notion of defendants' rights
and the reach of federal power. Partly because of his experience
with Warren, who had none, Eisenhower later decided that prior
judicial service would be a prerequisite for appointment to the
high tribunal - and gave the nation Justice William Brennan.
Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson - like President
Harry Truman earlier - seemingly had few ideological concerns in
their appointments to the Court. Unfortunately, one of Johnson's
appointees, Abe Fortas, maintained both the flexible ethics and the
personal and advisory relationship with Johnson that might have
been tolerated or accepted from a lawyer in private practice, but
were not appropriate for a Justice of the Supreme Court.
President Richard Nixon and his Republican successors set out
to remold the Court according to conservative doctrine. Nixon
spoke often of judges who would support "the peace forces" - the
police - as against the "criminal forces" - the defendants. Nixon
chose Warren Burger to replace the retiring Earl Warren as Chief
Justice. Burger looked like Central Casting's idea of a chief justice.
Had Senate Republicans not blocked the nomination, Abe For-
tas, chosen by his friend and patron, Lyndon Johnson, would have
been Chief Justice. However, when Warren submitted his resigna-
tion in the summer of 1968, Republicans argued that lame-duck
Johnson should not appoint a new Chief Justice so soon before an
election.
In recent confirmation battles, conservative Senators have de-
cried probes into nominees' judicial philosophy. Theirs was a dif-
ferent song when the nomination of Fortas to be Chief Justice was
before' the Senate. Then, Senator J. Strom Thurmond of South
Carolina said that the Senate had a responsibility to probe Fortas'
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thinking. Indeed, Thurmond said, "I believe the Senate should re-
ject this nomination and reverse this trend in the Court."6
Having succeeded in removing Justice Fortas (efforts against
Justice William 0. Douglas were unsuccessful), Nixon first sought
to appoint Judge F. Clement Haynsworth and later, Judge G. Har-
rold Carswell. Ethical concerns (and the concerted efforts of organ-
ized labor and the NAACP) helped defeat Haynsworth. Judge
Carswell was an acknowledged mediocrity and the earnest plea of
Senator Roman Hruska that the mediocre were entitled to a seat
on the High Court proved unavailing.' Nixon then named William
Rehnquist, an Assistant United States Attorney General and faith-
ful servant of the Administration, and Lewis Powell, a Richmond
lawyer of considerable distinction. Later, with the appointment of
Harry Blackmun, the Court's "Minnesota Twins" (Burger was the
other) were born.
President Nixon's efforts to appoint "strict constructionists" to
the bench contributed greatly to placing the High Court in the po-
litical vortex. Ronald Reagan greatly accelerated this trend with
his accession to the presidency (Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford,
had appointed the moderate John Paul Stevens as the replacement
for the fiery liberal Douglas). President Reagan, urged on by con-
servative elements, looked for judges who seemed disposed to "fol-
low the election returns," as Mr. Dooley had said of the Supreme
Court.8 Reagan pledged to name a woman to the High Court and
that vow was redeemed by the appointment of conservative Sandra
Day O'Connor, an Arizona politician and jurist. On the retirement
of Chief Justice Burger, Reagan named the arch-conservative Wil-
liam Rehnquist to be Chief Justice and appointed conservative and
scholarly Antonin Scalia to fill the vacant Rehnquist seat.
Rehnquist's nomination was controversial, re-opening the debate
that had ensued with his first appointment in 1971 on his role as a
law clerk in the 1950's. Rehnquist clerked for Justice Robert Jack-
son. Supreme Court files contained a memorandum, seemingly pre-
pared by Rehnquist, dealing with the school segregation cases that
urged the affirmation of the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy
v. Ferguson." Justice Jackson joined the unanimous holding in
6. 114 CONG. REc. 28,776 (1968) (remarks of Senator Strom Thurmond, R-SC).
7. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1970, at 21.
8. FINLEY P. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY AT His BEST 77 (Elmer Ellis ed., 1969).
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Brown v. Board of Education0 that segregation in public educa-
tion was unconstitutional. Rehnquist insisted that the memoran-
dum reflected his understanding of Jackson's thinking.
In any case, despite the civil rights community and other liberal
elements' opposition to Rehnquist, he was confirmed," albeit by
the smallest vote ever given a nominee for Chief Justice.
The hottest political battle erupted the following year, with the
retirement of Justice Lewis F. Powell, the moderate author of the
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 2 decision, and
with the subsequent nomination of Robert H. Bork, then a Judge
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
Judge Bork possessed a long record of legal achievements and
was the author of many a controversial statement. He had declared
his belief that passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with its pub-
lic-accommodations provisions, represented an act of "unsurpassed
ugliness" in requiring non-discriminatory operations. 3 Judge Bork
had also declared on the record, that the Supreme Court decision
which made restrictive covenants unenforceable by the courts was
wrong. 14 He also said the Court erred in striking down a poll tax,
the iniquitous device long used in the South to deny blacks the
ballot.' 5
Based on his academic and professional background, Robert
Bork was a nominee of considerable merit. What made the Bork
nomination such a political battleground was the perception that
Judge Bork's accession to the High Court would have tilted the
balance of the Court. President Reagan and his associates made no
secret of their determination to mold the courts, including the Su-
preme Court, to reflect conservative dogma. Indeed, a nationwide
committee of leading conservatives was formed to promote Judge
Bork's confirmation."
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. 132 CONG. REV. 12,799 (1986).
12. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. Robert H. Bork, Civil Rights - A Challenge, NE w REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21.
14. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 15-16 (addressing racially restrictive covenants).
15. Solicitor General Confirmation Hearings (1973) (statement of Robert H. Bork); Rob-
ert H. Bork, Foreword to GARY L. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CON-
STITUTIONAL THEORY at vii (1985).
16. Lynne Weil, Committee to Support Bork Announced, UPI, July 22, 1987, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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The fight over the Bork nomination was bitter and bruising. Op-
ponents resorted to an intensive media and advertising blitz. Ulti-
mately, the Senate rejected the nomination. 17 An embittered Judge
Bork left the federal bench. 8
Faced with his first appointment to the High Court, President
Bush chose David Souter, a little-known New Hampshireman and
a very recent appointee to the United States Second Circuit Court
of Appeals bench. Justice Souter replaced ultra-liberal Justice Wil-
liam Brennan. 19 Judge Souter, who had no extensive paper trail
and who disclosed nothing of any views he may have had, easily
became Justice Souter2
President Bush's next appointment was destined to be a political
hot potato. In late June, 1991, Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first
African-American to sit on the High Court, announced his inten-
tion to retire.2 ' To replace him, Bush chose a conservative African-
American appellate judge of recent vintage, Clarence Thomas, the
former controversial Chairman of the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.22 According to Bush, Thomas was the
best man in the country for the appointment. In political terms, he
was the best black man with sufficiently conservative ideology to
be considered.
Thomas' known and perceived hostility to many traditional civil
rights concerns and remedies, and his strictures on black leaders
with whom he disagreed, served to render him objectionable to the
civil rights community. Even so, there was division and hesitancy
about opposing his confirmation. The NAACP acted to oppose
Thomas after a study of his record, including public statements,
and face-to-face discussions with him. Some groups withheld judg-
ment and others endorsed the nomination. Polls indicated broad,
popular support for Thomas among blacks, and many Southern
Democrats, heavily dependent on black votes, were in a quandary.
Ultimately, eleven Senate Democrats voted for confirmation, giving
17. 133 CONG. REC. 15,079 (1987).
18. Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Nomination of Reagan Supreme Court Nomi-
nee, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 28, 1988, at All.
19. President Bush Names David Souter to Supreme Court to Fill Brennan Vacancy,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 24, 1990, at A10.
20. 136 CONG. REC. 14,413 (1990).
21. Justice Marshall Announces Retirement, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 28, 1991, at
A12.
22. Bush Nominates Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of Supreme Court,
DAILY LAB. REP. BNA), July 2, 1991, at A12.
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Thomas the narrow 52-48 victory and placing him on the High
Court.
The first round of Thomas hearings elicited little from the nomi-
nee other than hymns of praise for his supposed self-help philoso-
phy and discussion of the absence of indoor plumbing'in his early
life. After the first hearings were concluded, the Committee held a
second round of hearings to inquire into charges of sexual harass-
ment made against the nominee by a female law professor, Anita
Hill, who had been a Thomas subordinate at the federal Depart-
ment of Education and EEOC. The alleged incidents were a decade
old. Republican Senators were merciless in their questioning of
Hill and her supporters. Thomas made an emotional defense (and
had the advantage of having the widest possible television audi-
ence for his denial). He called that phase of the hearings, "a high-
tech lynching for uppity blacks who . . deign to think for
themselves. '23
The recent cases - Bork and Thomas - demonstrate that
where political and ideological concerns motivate the Executive,
Senators and interest groups will not prove laggard in mounting a
political counter-offensive.
Quite apart from the merits of particular nominees, so long as
government is divided between the parties, with one holding the
White House and the other in control of the Senate, there will be
intense debate. It is true that the President has the appointing
power, but it is not a unilateral power. Confirmation requires the
advice and consent of the Senate. Presidents select nominees re-
flective of their views and the views of their supporters. Many Sen-
ators feel that they, too, represent a broad body of opinion -
opinion that deserves to be respected.
The Senate has no duty to "rubber-stamp" the President's nom-
ination of an ideologically chosen jurist. True, there is a long-
standing principle that a president ordinarily is entitled to have
his nominees approved. That principle, however, is more appropri-
ately applied to the Cabinet and other officers who will serve in the
President's official family.
Comity between the executive and legislative branches does not
and cannot require that the Senate slavishly follow the executive
23. Clarence Page, Clarence Thomas Feeds Blacks Conspiracy Fears, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 16,
1991, at C19.
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lead in appointments to the courts. The Constitution created the
courts as independent, co-equal branches of government. The
President bears the power of choice. The Senate has the power of
approval. Thus, the one un-elected branch of government is the
product of agreement between the elected branches.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist No. 76, observed
that "[i]t will be readily comprehended, that a man, who had him-
self the sole disposition of offices, would be governed much more
by his private inclinations and interests, than when he was bound
to submit the propriety of his choice to the discussion and deter-
mination of a different and independent body; and that body an
entire branch of the Legislature."'24
According to Hamilton, a President faced with possible rejection
of a nominee would show "care in proposing." A president, Hamil-
ton wrote,
would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward for the most
distinguished or lucrative stations, candidates who had no other
merit, than that of coming from the same State to which he particu-
larly belonged, or of being in some way or other personally allied to
him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to
render them obsequious instruments of his pleasure.25
It is not wrong for presidents to seek judicial appointees who
share their views. Neither is it wrong for Senators to probe deeply
into the views (in general terms) of nominees.
Senators have every right to vote their convictions on judicial
nominees.
That is not wrong. It is politics.
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
25. Id.
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